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BOOK REVIEW
COMPARATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION POLICY. By Eckard Rehbinder &
Richard Stewart. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1985.
Pp. xxiv, 350.
Reviewed by James E. Krier*
Environmental problems have been on the agenda of the fed-
eral government in the United States for roughly a century now,
about half of the government's life, and a dominant concern for
the last two decades. The European Economic Community
("EEC"), itself a system perhaps on its way to some brand of
federalism, presents a similar but much foreshortened picture. The
EEC has been concerned with the environment for about the last
half of its thirty year life. Environmental Protection Policy'
("EPP") is a richly detailed study of environmental policy in these
two very different systems.
EPP lacks a preface or other introductory statement of objec-
tives by the authors,2 so one has to guess from the final product
what the initial ambitions were and how well they have been met.
Some fairly clear objectives emerge. One objective apparently was
to consider the development and present condition of environmen-
tal law and policy in the EEC and the U.S.3 The book succeeds
admirably here. A related objective, not revealed until the last
chapter, was comparative policy analysis of the two systems in
question. Actually, all of the book is comparative, but most of it
only implicitly so. The last chapter, Chapter 10, is an exception in
this regard, but unhappily a rather limited one. A third objective
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1. E. REHBINDER & R. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION POLICY (1985)
[hereinafter cited by page number only].
2. EPP is part of a series. See I INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW, EUROPE AND THE
AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE, METHODS, TOOLS AND INSTITUTIONS (M. Cappelletti,
M. Seccombe & J. Weiler eds. 1986) [hereinafter VOL. ONE]. The book under review,
though designated Volume Two, was copyrighted, and presumably published, a year before
the introductory volume. The series editors' foreword to the present volume says little
about the precise ambitions of the book, other than the promise of a "tight comparative
analysis," an interdisciplinary approach, and an analytic framework. See pp. v-viii.
3. EPP devotes eight of its ten chapters to this objective.
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was to model the "logic" (p. 9) of policy integration in federal
systems. 4 In this context, "integration," sometimes called "har-
monization" or "coordination," refers to the problems and pro-
cesses of meshing policy in a legal regime comprising a central
authority and decentralized member states, each with distinct pow-
ers and desires. In the U.S., of course, the actors are the federal
government and the states; in the EEC they are such Community
institutions as the Commission and the Council, on the one hand,
and the member nations of the Common Market on the other.
The policies of concern in EPP all have to do with environ-
mental quality,5 an obviously appropriate focus for a study of
coordinated lawmaking in systems that mix centralized and decen-
tralized authority. Pollution ignores political boundaries, so sen-
sible coordinated programs of control must sometimes do so as
well. The decentralized governmental units clustered together-in
a problem shed and a union-have to recognize that the environ-
mental problems and programs of each affect the others. The
central governmental authority faces related problems: it might
wish to impose uniform requirements on member states, but these
could neglect political, economic, and geographic diversity; it
might wish to respect diversity by tailoring non-uniform require-
ments, but these could exacerbate the problem of coordination.
The wayward nature of pollution is a general reason to center
an examination of integrated policymaking on environmental prob-
lems. There are other, particular reasons to look at the U.S. and
the EEC. Both communities have been especially active in the
field for some years now, implementing a number of state and
central government control programs; these provide a rich body
of material to study and policy to harmonize. The U.S. is especially
relevant for comparative purposes: in coordinating environmental
controls, this mature federal system has confronted and attempted
to resolve a variety of problems, an experience that contains valu-
able lessons. Coordination on the Continent presents additional
intriguing political and legal problems. The EEC was founded upon
4. I would guess that EPP has ambitions beyond the three mentioned above-the
description and critical evaluation of U.S. and EEC environmental policy, the modeling of
integration's logic, and the comparative study of policy. I think, for example, that the
authors have attempted to enlighten us on the operations of federal systems generally, and
perhaps they have succeeded. But I leave that and other possible contributions aside.
5. Other studies in the series concern such substantive areas as consumer protection,
corporation law, and energy policy. See, e.g., VOL. ONE, supra note 2.
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economic premises concerned foremost if not exclusively with
trade;6 hence Community efforts to harmonize environmental pol-
icy test both the legal competence of its central institutions and
the communal ambitions of its member states.
EPP's effort to model the logic of coordinated environmental
policy proceeds in two segments. Chapter 1 sets out the elements
and operations of the model, which are used to generate a series
of "working hypotheses" (p. 1) about how the incentives for and
against coordination interact with a variety of coordination mech-
anisms. The interaction produces final policies of various kinds,
ranging from centrally imposed uniform ambient or emission stan-
dards all the way down to central programs that merely encourage
states to cooperate. The working hypotheses, or some of them in
any event, are revisited in Chapter 10, the final chapter of the
book. By this time the authors have developed a full picture of
environmental policy in the EEC and the U.S.; they can draw
upon it to test and, if necessary, reformulate their model.
From the standpoint of an American specialist in domestic
environmental law, familiar with the U.S. federal setting but more
or less ignorant, albeit curious, about the developing shape of the
EEC's environmental policy, I consider EPP an impressive
achievement. Eckard Rehbinder and Richard Stewart are in many
respects well suited for their ambitious project. The former is a
member of the law faculty of the University of Frankfurt and an
authority on European environmental law. The latter7 teaches ad-
ministrative and environmental law at the Harvard Law School.
His work in these fields, which encompasses law and economics
and law and politics, both pertinent to the present study, as well
as research directly concerned with problems of environmental
policy in a federal system, is well-known and widely respected in
the United States. But neither Rehbinder nor Stewart is a com-
parative lawyer, yet EPP is among other things a work in com-
parative law. 8 If the book has shortcomings, I am inclined to
believe that some of them lie here.9 But the inclination is a modest
one. I am not a comparative lawyer either, and hence not the best
6. See, e.g., p. 15.
7. Stewart, I should disclose, has been a co-author of mine.
8. The essay introducing the entire series stresses the comparative nature of the
undertaking. VOL. ONE, supra note 2, at 5 (one of the "principal guidelines" of the series
is "a full utilization of the comparative method.")
9. Other shortcomings lie in the modeling exercise. See infra parts II and III.
1987]
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judge of quality scholarship in the area. In any event, the short-
comings I shall mention are understandable enough. Considering
the richness and variegation of the institutional, cultural, and po-
litical terrains explored by Rehbinder and Stewart, the discipline
of comparative law could probably expect little more than what
EPP achieves.
I.
The bulk of EPP consists of eight middle chapters describing
and evaluating EEC and U.S. environmental law and policy. The
descriptive and analytic material is the least novel but most sat-
isfying part of the book, and will prove for many readers to be the
most useful. One gets a sense of EPP's scope from the two chap-
ters on substantive environmental law (Chapters 4 and 5); they
cover water pollution, air pollution, noise pollution, waste dis-
posal, hazardous substances, radioactivity, land use, and environ-
mental impact assessment. Obviously, given its length and objec-
tives, EPP cannot provide the final detailed word on each of these
subjects, but it is difficult to imagine a concise introductory source
providing greater breadth of description and depth of analysis.
The eight middle chapters are organized in alternating discus-
sions on EEC and U.S. law, policy, and practice on particular
topics. The discussions tend to be exhaustive rather than selective,
somewhat in the manner of a conventional but first-rate legal trea-
tise on a subject of intimidating breadth-essentially all the rele-
vant environmental law and policy in the two systems. Beginning
with a discussion of elementary background material-institutional
jurisdiction, powers granted and constraints imposed by the Con-
stitution and by EEC treaties, the judicial role in the two systems,
and the like-this part of the book moves through an analysis of
substantive environmental law, considers next matters of imple-
mentation and enforcement, and closes with two excellent in-
terpretive essays on the environmental policy process here and in
the Community.
The authors label the eight middle chapters "empirical"
(p. 13), which could be taken to mean free of theory, or based on
close study of the factual details of everyday operations, but nei-
ther meaning fits exactly. The facts the chapters deal with are not
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the data that a social scientist would gather, tabulate, digest, and
evaluate as part of a typical empirical study. Instead, the facts are
more akin to descriptions from a distinctly legal, or lawyer's, point
of view. The chapters are informative narratives that trace the
development of particular institutions and doctrines, outline and
discuss pertinent treaty and constitutional provisions, and describe
and evaluate particular methods of intervention that have been or
could be used to achieve harmonization-all the while drawing
upon and sometimes criticizing a large body of secondary litera-
ture. There is some theory, much (but not all) of it lawyer's theory
about how to reconcile a line of cases or justify some piece of
legislation in the face of a contrary constitutional or treaty
provision. 10
These remarks are meant to characterize, not criticize, the
middle portion of EPP. Readers versed in the environmental policy
of only one of the two systems under study will likely find the
alternating chapters on the other legal culture the most interesting
and illuminating." For example, the U.S. environmental lawyer
reading the chapter on substantive U.S. environmental law will
probably find little that is remarkably new; and so too, I would
guess, of the Community environmental lawyer reading the equiv-
alent EEC chapter. What might be new is the emphasis of the
discussions, the focus (not always adhered to) on problems of
coordination in federal systems.
Perhaps the two chapters on the policy process in the EEC
and the U.S., Chapters 8 and 9, are exceptions to the foregoing
observations on the "empirical" nature of the middle eight chap-
ters. These two chapters aim to provide an interpretive overview
of environmental policymaking in the respective systems, with
particular attention-again-to the central governments' success
in achieving sensibly coordinated policy. Part of the effort is ex-
planatory. The authors consider the combination of political influ-
ences, legal means and constraints, and institutional factors that
10. Even the chapters on implementation and enforcement, Chapters 6 and 7, pro-
ceed largely in this manner, though a more emphatically empirical or theoretical treatment,
or both, might have been especially apt and revealing.
11. Some of the chapters are less than perfect primers, however. Chapter 2's intro-
duction to the general legal picture in the Community, for example, left me puzzled about
a few basics, and I found myself looking to other sources to pin down some fundamental
matters. Given this experience, I can imagine that European readers of Chapter 3's over-
view of the federal system in the U.S. will find themselves similarly confused at times.
1987]
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have contributed to the shape of policy in the EEC and the U.S.
Another part involves policy critique, again largely from the per-
spective of successful integration. U.S. readers will find the chap-
ter on the EEC policy process to be remarkably informative, pro-
viding in one relatively short span an extraordinarily thorough and
discriminating analysis. (Pp. 203-83.) But U.S. readers should also
profit, as foreign readers undoubtedly will, from Chapter 9's dis-
cussion of the policy process in the United States. Little of this
material is new; the chapter succeeds instead by pulling together
and in some cases artfully rearranging so much of the familiar. I
particularly appreciated, to mention just a few examples, the chap-
ter's account of the tripartite nature of federal environmental reg-
ulation (pp. 288-91), which distinguishes among national product
markets (e.g., new motor vehicles), energy resources, and indus-
trial processes, and the discussion of implementation and enforce-
ment patterns. (Pp. 301-04.) And I benefited from the chapter's
sustained attention to federal policy in terms of the different de-
grees of harmonization it has achieved, why, and with what
implications.
Chapter 9 is not flawless, of course. 12 For example, the au-
thors imply (at p. 288) that fear of trade barriers arising from
multiple state controls was an insignificant factor in federal regu-
lation of new motor vehicles; they also seem to suggest, at least
to the uninformed reader, that the states sought federal regulation.
In my view both points are incorrect: the auto companies them-
selves sought federal intervention, and precisely because they
feared multiple state standards-a kind of barrier to trade.13 And
the authors say, in an excellent account of industrial process reg-
ulation (p. 289), that state fear of industrial flight from strict con-
trols, likely more fanciful than real, has nevertheless led states in
the past to enact lax pollution standards in order to successfully
compete for industry. I think it is correct that unfounded fears
induced the states to act as they did; however, the discussion then
goes on to suggest, again at least to the uninformed reader, that
uniform federal process regulations eliminate the "competitive dis-
tortions" of state-set, non-uniform standards-a suggestion that is
12. I suppose Chapter 8 on the policy process in the EEC, as to which I have less
knowledge and therefore less of a critical vantage point, contains flaws as well.
13. See J. KRIER & E. URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY 173-75, 181--84 (1977) [here-
inafter KRIER & URSIN]. EPP acknowledges the point, but only in a later chapter. P. 316.
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correct but misleading. If states cannot compete for industry
through lax pollution controls, they will do so on another basis
such as property tax relief, or promotion or exploitation of an
inexpensive labor market, and new distortions may result. 14 In-
deed, there is considerable evidence that some states have pro-
moted uniform federal process regulations precisely in order to
distort competition by achieving cartels. 15 Another flaw in Chapter
9 lies in the authors' suggestion (p. 297) that specification stan-
dards, which require polluters to use a particular technology, have
lower administrative costs than performance standards, which
leave the choice of means to polluters so long as the means achieve
the end, and that the cost difference properly influences legislative
design. I think that in most cases the difference in administrative
costs between the two systems is only apparent 6 and should not
affect legislative choice, or at least not much; the choice should
turn more on the capacity of the regulated sector to engage in or
employ the fruits of research and development programs.1 7 Finally,
14. Some of the discussion in Chapter 8, on the Community policy process, suggests
that the authors appreciate the problem. See p. 218 (critically addressing the "distortions
of competition" argument).
15. See, e.g., p. 298 n. 17 (discussing B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/
DIRTY AIR (1981)). At least with regard to pollutants the effects of which do not spill over
into other states, uniform ambient standards can be viewed as the result of states-
environmental states in particular-using the federal government to help them build a
nationwide cartel. State A, for example, might wish to have demanding standards but fear
industrial flight. If it and others like it can get the government to impose strict standards
everywhere, part of the problem is solved. States like A can achieve their internal envi-
ronmental objectives without compromising their competitive position vis-a-vis other (pol-
luter) states in the process; they can avoid having to make the trade-offs between quality
and growth that competition among the states would otherwise require. This observation
does not apply, of course, where there are interstate spillovers. In the latter case there are
technological (distorting) externalities; in the former the externalities are pecuniary only,
and entirely consistent with a healthy competitive environment.
16. Specification standards might easily have administrative costs as high as, or
higher than, performance standards because both approaches require monitoring. Operation
and maintenance costs of pollution control equipment commonly amount to half or more
of total annual costs, so even when the specified technology is installed, polluters have
powerful incentives to unplug it or let it deteriorate. Hence, careful monitoring is required,
just as with performance standards. It probably is the case that violations of specification
standards are usually easier-cheaper-to prove than violations of performance standards;
however, specification programs generally require employment of a relatively large flock
of government engineers and other expensive technicians compared to the sort of staff
needed for a program based on performance standards. On balance, then, specification
standard programs could have higher total administrative costs than performance standard
programs.
17. Performance standards create stronger incentives for research and development.
Accordingly, they should probably be most favored when the regulated industry has the -
capacity to act on the incentive. Contrast the situation of, say, smoke controls on backyard
incinerators, where it is silly to think about the ability of the regulated class to develop
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the authors suggest that federal intervention has commonly em-
ployed geographically uniform standards of one sort or another
(uniform ambient quality standards are the best example) because
non-uniform standards that impose different requirements on dif-
ferent states would meet formidable political obstacles. (P. 298.)
But since states do not possess equal ability to meet a uniform
standard, the uniform standard quite clearly discriminates among
them-de facto if not de jure-and so, as with non-uniform stan-
dards, significant political obstacles should arise. 18 Hence the au-
thors' theory can, at best, only partially explain the federal gov-
ernment's affection for uniformity.
II.
In addition to considering the development and present con-
dition of environmental law and policy in the EEC and the U.S.,
EPP aims to model the logic of policy integration in a federal
system. The book attempts to do this primarily in its first and final
chapters. The model in question is not easy to describe, and this
may be part of its problem. Social models are supposed to self-
consciously simplify reality in order to generate crisp hypotheses
about behavior, which can in turn be tested against observed evi-
dence.19 If a model is validated-if the evidence supports its hy-
potheses-then we might gain insight into cause and effect rela-
tionships. The simplicity of the model helps us locate those
underlying conditions we should alter in order to alter behavior in
some desired way. If the model and the evidence diverge, or if
alterations in underlying conditions produce bizarre results, a
new-and always simple-model is necessary. It would be coun-
terproductive to keep "complicating" the model instead, for in the
end the model and reality would converge and the whole point of
modeling would be lost.
better devices (and probably equally silly to suppose that members of the class could make
discriminating choices among devices developed by independent manufacturers).
18. As they have, and as the authors recognize. See, e.g., p. 298 (discussion of
problems of implementation of uniform ambient standards).
19. "Busy" models are suspect, especially if they generate only soft hypotheses so
general in character that a whole range of evidence endorses or fails to support them,
depending on one's pre-existing point of view.
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That said, consider EPP's model, which the authors describe
early on as "simple" (p. 1) and which they later, in Chapter 10,
revise in the light of the "empirical" work set out in Chapters 2
through 9. Essentially, the model assumes an abstract community
of states, each with specified characteristics: each is assumed to
be a monolith, that is, there are not within it a variety of actors
with their own different agendas; each is assumed to want both
environmental quality and economic growth; and each is assumed
to make trade-offs between these two goals, environmental states
opting for more quality and less growth, polluter states opting for
the opposite. Now obviously these are simple assumptions, and
in more ways than one.2
0
The model's apparatus, on the other hand, is very compli-
cated. Part of the apparatus deals with the incentives and disin-
centives any state might have to integrate policy. 21 If different
states in a system, for example, adopt different product regulations
and if this interferes with the easy flow of commerce across state
boundaries, then the costs of production will rise; firms will lose
economies of scale as they differentiate their products to conform
with the myriad of divergent regulations. Alternatively, some prod-
ucts will simply stay out of interstate commerce. In either event,
any state can suffer, whether from losing revenues, from losing
the benefits of consumption, or both. In consequence, all states
have some incentive to achieve harmonized product regulations
that are mutually satisfying given their respective wants regarding
the quality/economy trade-off. For another example, consider reg-
ulation of industrial processes within a state. Here the strict reg-
ulations of an environmental state might not unacceptably impede
interstate commerce; however, they will hinder the efforts of the
environmental state's industries to compete with firms in polluter
states. So the environmental state, fearing loss of revenues or the
flight of firms to polluter havens, has some incentive to favor
harmonization by way of roughly equal, and relatively demanding,
process controls in all states in the system.
The authors give other examples of incentives to integration
as well (pp. 3-4): the need for a central authority or uniform
20. This is a point of which the authors prove to be aware, and to which we shall
return. See infra part III,
21. See pp. 3-6. There is an earlier discussion of "tools for environmental control,"
pp. 2-3, but the list of methods plays only a weak role in the model.
1987]
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understanding to deal with transboundary pollution spillovers; the
benefits of economies of scale afforded by centralized research on
matters of scientific, technological, or analytic value to all states;
the advantages of a common front as the states of one system
engage in international negotiations with the states of another
system.
Disincentives to integration are also discussed (pp. 5-6), most
of them obvious enough. Variations in preferences among the
states make it difficult to achieve harmonized-which often must
mean homogeneous-policy because any one state is likely to find
that the uniform policy requires too much of it, or too little of
some other state.22 Differences in geographic, demographic, in-
dustrial, and economic considerations among the states also frus-
trate easy integration; so do differences in legal systems that can
hinder consistent administration of an otherwise coordinated pol-
icy. Resentment of central control can impede some types of har-
monization, and central control can result in diseconomies. These
are not the only disincentives to coordination, but they are illus-
trative of the factors built into the simple model.
Another piece of the model's apparatus, and one that adds
considerably to the model's complexity, has to do with various
"mechanisms" of achieving "complete" and "partial" integration.
(Pp. 6-9.) Complete integration, for example, can be realized by
a central authority through enactment of regulations or encourage-
ment of roughly uniform measures among the states; it can also
be achieved through judicial invalidation of state product standards
that are more demanding than the norm, by such means as the
negative commerce clause doctrine. The result predicted here is
uniformity at the level of the lowest common denominator. Partial
integration, rather than achieving the same measures everywhere,
mediates conflict in other ways-say by allowing environmental
states to adopt standards more demanding than the federal stan-
dard or the prevailing practice, while foreclosing polluter states
from doing less. This technique the authors call "minimum har-
monization," but they have a rich menu of alternative approaches
to partial integration-"optional harmonization," "alternative har-
22. An ideally tailored policy that varies in such a way as to satisfy all the states
might be possible in principle, but ideally tailored policies are costly to develop, and cost
is a disincentive to integration--especially where each state has an interest in pushing the
cost on to the other states, and all the states on to the central government.
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monization," and even "partial harmonization," poorly labeled be-
cause it is a subset of a set given the same name--each of which
is characterized by the particular degree of coordination that it
achieves.
We are now back to the simple model and ready to put it to
work. The original assumptions of the model in mind, and mindful
too of the incentives for and against integration, will there be
integration and through what mechanism? The tentative answers
to these questions, sketched at the end of the first chapter of EPP
(pp. 9-13), are the book's "working hypotheses." There is no point
in going through all the hypotheses here, but it is worth seeing
how the model works.
What a state does about pollution and its control is almost
sure to affect other states as well. This interdependency creates
(or so the authors say) two incentives for harmonization-one to
remove trade barriers and the other to increase environmental
controls. These incentives work differently in the case of product
regulation on the one hand and process regulation on the other.
To examine how, the authors construct a matrix (p. 10) with two
vertical elements-regulation of products and of processes-and
two horizontal ones-elimination of trade barriers and promotion
of environmental quality. So there are four boxes, each containing
a different mix of incentives.
Take the box representing product regulation/elimination of
trade barriers. If environmental states can exclude dirty products
made in polluter states, polluter states will lose a market; hence
the latter have an interest in integration. More specifically, from
the standpoint of complete integration, and assuming a system
requiring unanimous agreement by all member states,23 polluter
states will happily agree to a central (federal) program imposing
uniform control requirements at the lowest level at which the
marginal costs (of meeting standards) and benefits (in the form of
a larger market) of increased control are equal for any polluter
state. 24 But if environmental states are not allowed to exclude
23. For most purposes there is at least a nominal requirement of unanimity in the
Community, but in practice the constraint has not been so formidable as one might suppose
it would be. See, e.g., pp. 315-16.
24. Or so say the authors. P. 10. Notice the ambiguity of "lowest." I prefer saying
that polluter states will unanimously agree to that level of control where the marginal costs
and benefits of increased control are equal for the worst-off polluter state. Other polluter
states might want more control here, but the worst-off would veto such a proposal. The
1987]
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polluter state products because, for example, negative commerce
clause doctrine forbids this,25 then the polluter states' incentive
disappears.
What about environmental states' incentives to integrate? We
move now to another box in the matrix, having to do with product
regulation/promotion of environmental quality. Environmental
states have to worry, in setting product standards for themselves,
about competition with other states-and this is true even if they
are allowed to exclude products moving in interstate commerce.
Environmental states could require domestic firms to manufacture
a clean product for local consumption but permit a cheaper dirty
one for export, but the apparent savings allowed by this approach
might be more than spent through loss of economies of scale. So
in order to avoid competitive disadvantages, environmental states
too will want harmonized policy, ideally (and unsurprisingly) at a
level close to what they would adopt in the absence of competition.
There results a hypothesis: polluter and environmental states
alike will support uniform product regulations. If environmental
states are denied the right to exclude products moving in interstate
commerce, then they will be more-and polluter states less-
interested in harmonization, with the likely result being coordi-
nation at an undemanding level. 26
The example sketched is probably the least adorned of all that
the authors work through. What it shares with the other hy-
potheses is, in my view, a certain softness: it identifies general
tendencies, perhaps usually unsurprising tendencies, but little
more. Some of the other hypotheses in Chapter 1, having to do
with the mechanisms of integration likely to be used in varying
situations, are more detailed but, again, the authors' predictions
are rather general given the busyness of the model. For example,
regarding product regulation in the EEC before development of a
negative commerce clause doctrine, the model "would predict con-
siderable uniform harmonization (at an intermediate level) or op-
other polluter states can be expected to go along because they realize gains by doing so-
though not all the gains they otherwise might.
25. The Community appears to have a fairly strong negative commerce clause doc-
trine. See p. 10 n.7.
26. This assumes a rule of unanimity. The authors claim that a system with majority
rule, the U.S., for example, will achieve uniform product regulation but at a more stringent
level. I am not sure I understand the assertion. Would not the result depend on the number
of environmental as compared to polluter states?
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tional or partial harmonization." (P. 12.) Somehow the effort in-
volved seems to call for more precision.
III.
The foregoing discussion suggests the complexity of EPP's
simple model and indicates the sorts of insights it yields. The
hypotheses generated by the model are developed with extraor-
dinary terseness, using little more print than was consumed here
outlining just a few of them. And then, for all the reader's effort,
the material is essentially abandoned for exactly three
hundred pages, until Chapter 10 and its re-examination, in light of
the intervening "empirical chapters," of Chapter l's initial
predictions .27
Re-examination of the EPP model of the logic of integration
is not the only objective of Chapter 10; another is to engage in
explicit "comparative analysis of the empirical material" presented
at length in EPP's eight middle chapters. (P. 13.) Each is a prom-
ising enterprise; in neither case, however, is the promise fully
redeemed.
A problematic model emerges from Chapter 10's re-exami-
nation. We know even as we read through the simple model de-
veloped in Chapter 1 that some of its hypotheses are off the mark;
the authors tell us so. Some of the predictions about the EEC in
particular are said to depart from the actual picture-a result the
authors attribute to log-rolling, or reciprocal concessions over
time; to the possibility of disproportionate political influence on
the part of some countries, despite the nominal rule of unanimity;
to the preferences of multinational firms; and to several other
factors. (Pp. 12-13.) In other words, the simple model, already
complex, is clearly not complex enough. Other factors, like those
mentioned above, have to be added, yet the more we build them
in the further we move away from a model and toward a general
description of reality. The end product is a device that, at best,
rationalizes evidence much as an interpretive history would. In-
terpretive history is a wonderful enterprise. What it is not is a
modeling enterprise that yields testable hypotheses.
27. There are occasional brief references to the working hypotheses in the middle
chapters.
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A reading of the discussion in Chapter 10 compels this con-
clusion. In two important respects the chapter alters what clearly
were simplistic assumptions in the original model. (Pp. 315-16.)
The original model assumed that the states in a system were mono-
lithic actors; that is, it assumed that each state acts with a single
mind. But the reality, of course, is that within each state there is
a diverse collection of influential actors-politicians of different
parties, interest groups of various persuasions, mass media, and
so on. The original model also assumed that each state is either of
the environmental or the polluter sort. But the reality, of course,
is that a given state might be an environmental type regarding air
pollution, a polluter type regarding water pollution, indifferent as
to noise pollution, and so on. When these factors, plus log-rolling,
plus extraneous political factors (say where a few states in the
system become temporarily strong or weak by virtue of some
happenstance), plus the activities of entrepreneurial politicians,
plus the occurrence of episodic environmental crises that can fo-
ment action for a brief period, plus a variety of other considera-
tions are all worked into the calculus, we end up with something
that, whatever its virtues, simply cannot be called a model of
anything. The final product can give us insights into the incredible
number of things that can influence some other thing; it can put
some order on what seemed a confused picture. But it cannot
generate reliable predictions and, hence, it cannot tell us much
about how to alter reality in the future.
Still, it is true that when we turn to Chapter 10 we find that
the evidence supports some of the simple model's hypotheses.
This, however, is hardly surprising-partly because the model at
its simplest does have some virtues; partly because there is little
in the model that is counter-intuitive, so that common sense would
lead one just where the model does; 28 partly because the softness
of the model's predictions virtually guarantees the existence of
some supporting evidence. As the authors recognize, the original
model was too simple in its assumptions:
In short, while the model and its hypotheses are helpful
in understanding the process of regulatory integration in the
US and the EC, modifications in the model's assumptions are
28. Which usually means that common sense was built into some of the model's
assumptions in the first place.
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needed to approximate the actual complexity of the decisional
processes and their results. At this point, however, it does not
seem feasible to develop a more complex model that would
generate empirically testable hypotheses. (P. 317.)
Thus, one objective we were led to expect Chapter 10 would
attain, a thoroughgoing reworking of EPP's original model of the
logic of integration, was never met; what is delivered, instead, is
little more than the scanty material summarized in the preceding
few paragraphs. The second thing we were led to expect was an
essay putting the EEC and U.S. experiences into comparative
perspective. Here, too, Chapter 10 misses the mark.
Much of the book is implicitly comparative; the eight chapters
in the middle of the book alternate between how the two legal
regimes in question deal with various aspects of policy. But only
the most obsessive reader would come away from those chapters
with a handy picture of how the U.S. and the EEC compare, how
they contrast, and why. An overview at the end, then, would be
of great value. Instead, however, most of Chapter 10 contains only
another assessment of the Community picture. There are a few
pointed references to what the EEC and the U.S. have in common,
and a few to how they differ. But the incredible richness of the
eight middle chapters is never systematically attacked. By and
large, readers are left to make their own inferences.
IV.
EPP's failure to engage in a more thorough comparison of the
EEC and U.S. experiences might account for a theme that runs
throughout EPP-that Community environmental policy suffers
from ad hoc pragmatism. It has developed in a patchwork way,
not rationally and comprehensively but, instead, incrementally,
partially, on an ad hoc basis. The point is mentioned in Chapter
10 (p. 323); Chapter 8's discussion of the policy process in the
Community puts it more strongly:
Perhaps the most striking feature of Community environ-
mental law is its lack of focus, depth, and comprehensiveness.
Critical problems covered by federal legislation in all developed
federal systems are not addressed while less important prob-
lems are often minutely regulated ....
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This is primarily due to the pragmatic, ad hoc approach
taken by the Commission in identifying and developing subjects
for harmonization. Community environmental policy does not
function by identifying priority areas of environmental protec-
tion for Community harmonization and leaving less important
areas to member state legislation. (P. 203, footnote omitted.)
Implicit in EPP's criticism is the idea that the Community, a
mere fledgling, should stand today on ground achieved by "devel-
oped federal systems." Yet developed systems, I would guess, got
to where they are today only by following their own tortured brand
of pragmatic policymaking. At least in the case of federal environ-
mental policy in the U.S.-and this is particularly true of the
federal government's efforts to achieve integration-comprehen-
siveness and rationality, to the degree they exist, have been
achieved mostly through a long process of trial and error propelled
as much by incident, happenstance, and political self-interest as
by principled systematic policymaking. 29 We can expect more
progress of the Community than we once could of ourselves only
because it has the fruits of our experience to draw upon. But one
lesson of our experience is that policymaking largely defies ideal-
ized approaches. A point the EEC might take away from compar-
ative study of the U.S.-and which EPP would have done well to
recognize-is that, for all the difference in cultures, this reality
remains in common.
29. See, e.g., KRIER & URSIN, supra note 13, at 287-95.
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